Let’s visit the legendary Luma resin farm to learn about the best strains for making hash. Nestled in the wide and misty Petaluma Gap just north of San Francisco, Luma is an outdoor resin farm that specializes in growing fresh frozen material exclusively for hash production. It’s planting day at Luma, whose collaborations with brands like […]
The post The best strains for making hash appeared first on Leafly.
Welcome to the July 2025 horoscopes! Read this month's column & discover the strain that best matches this month's movements.
The post Star signs and cannabis strains: July 2025 horoscopes appeared first on Leafly.
Some cultivars are best enjoyed as oil. Find recommendations on the best strains for dabbing from expert hash maker, Will Hyde.
The post The best strains for dabbing appeared first on Leafly.
Find the best products for July 4th weekend. Leafly reviewed products for the holiday weekend & chose the best picks around the nation.
The post Fire products for fireworks, grilling & chilling this July 4th weekend appeared first on Leafly.
For a limited time, when you buy five of Al Capone’s all-natural blunt wraps, you can get another absolutely free.
The post Celebrate the summer with a special promo offer from Al Capone appeared first on Leafly.
This would be a good time to review the branding protection avenues available to cannabis business owners, and to discuss celebrity branding.
There are three main ways a brand owner can establish trademark rights:
Trademark rights are provided on a “first in time” and “highest in right” basis. Anyone using a word, symbol, or device to associate a source of a goods or services in commerce have the beginnings of potentially robust and protectable trademark rights. We call the rights granted from usage, and without any sort of registration, “common law” trademarks.
Any cannabis brand that is using a mark in commerce to sell their cannabis products likely has common law trademark rights in and to the mark in the geographical regions in which they are selling their products. The good thing about this, is trademark law protects a brand’s trademark from the date of first use in commerce– even without a registration. The drawback is that this protection extends only to the areas in which you have actually used your mark. So if you only sell your product within Washington state, a common law trademark would not prohibit someone from using an identical mark to sell their cannabis brand in Oregon. This can create potential confusion, and limit the growth and expansion of your brand to multiple states should your name become popular elsewhere before you expand and reach that new market.
Generally speaking, registering a trademark on the federal level with the USPTO is the best way to protect one’s mark nationally, even in areas in which you have not yet sold your product. However, because cannabis is still illegal under federal law, and because one requirement for registering a federal trademark is that the applicant has made “legal use” of the mark in commerce, the USPTO has continually refused to register marks for use on cannabis and any other goods and services that violate the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) or the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Under these federal regulations, it is unlawful to sell, offer for sale those products containing cannabinoids that are unlawful controlled substances under the CSA, and under the FDCA– even food products such as gummies that contain CBD.
So how do cannabis businesses go about protecting their brands nationally, when federal trademark protection is unavailable to marks used on federally illegal goods and services?
Previously, many cannabis lawyers recommended obtaining registration for ancillary goods or services that do not violate the CSA or FDCA, or for those classifications that are technically legal even though their products could be used illegally. For example, if you manufacture a cannabis-infused beverage AND you produce and sell a non-infused version of that beverage, it may be possible to secure a federal trademark registration to cover your non-infused beverages. Or likewise, if you sell products with legal cannabinoids, it may be possible to obtain a federal trademark registration for those non-prohibited products.
However, recently, the USPTO has examined all uses of the mark in commerce, including those that are not specified in the trademark application, by looking at extrinsic evidence. This examination includes looking at how your products are sold, what products are sold with your mark, and what the true intention of your products are. If the examining attorneys at the USPTO find your mark on unlawful goods, or they find evidence that your goods are actually intended for unlawful purposes, they are likely to refuse registration. An example of this, is smoking e-juice dab devices that are claimed to be tobacco products but are actually used for dabbing cannabis infusions. Recently, the USPTO has used extrinsic evidence to determine the true intent of the product to refuse registration. The USPTO will also examine you website and promotional material to determine if you are using the mark on unlawful products. This all means that obtaining a federal trademark registration has become a difficult feat, and while you can claim a lawful use in the application, the USPTO will look to find if you also have unlawful uses with the mark.
Another strategy we advise for our cannabis clients is state trademark registrations in as many states as possible– that is, wherever the mark is being used.
Though the protection afforded by a state trademark is geographically limited to the state of the registration, they still provide more extensive geographic protection and legal remedies than common law rights. Because common law rights can be limited to the smaller geographic areas in which you are using the mark, meaning that if you only do business in Seattle, your common law trademark rights could only protect you within the city of Seattle, a state based trademark registration does provide you wider state wide protection. And if you want to avail yourself of the potential statutory remedies available to trademark owners in infringement cases, you will need to register your mark.
Another form of brand protection, aside from trademark, is available to celebrities under concepts of “rights of publicity” in their name and likeness. This right of publicity gives individuals the right to control the commercial use of their identities. Companies cannot exploit a celebrity’s name or likeness without the celebrity’s consent and celebrities are free to use or license their identities as they choose.
A number of celebrities have jumped on the cannabis branding bandwagon, including the Marley estate, Snoop Dogg, Willy Nelson, Whoopi Goldberg and Melissa Etheridge, along with many lesser known celebrities who have used their name to promote ancillary cannabis products. See: Trademark Considerations for Your Celebrity Cannabis Licensing Deals. Though trademark registrations are at play for many of these brands, the rights of publicity of the celebrities are at the center of each of these branding deals. Because state law and not federal law regulates the right of publicity, it is not subject to the same restrictions based on legality of use as federal trademarks. This makes enforcement in the event of infringement much easier for celebrities under right of publicity principles.
Of course, even without the hurdles of federal trademark registration, using one’s name and likeness to sell cannabis is not without some conceptual risk– because these are still federally illegal products. However, given the proliferation of celebrity-branded cannabis, however, this appears to be a risk that many celebrities are willing to take to become early entrants into the cannabis market.
Celebrity endorsement can be a real leg up in an industry where federal law has made brand protection such a complex legal issue. Celebrities are nationally known figures, with the ability to enforce their rights of publicity in every state providing for such rights. Hitching your brand to a household name, provides the kind of national protection and recognition that comes close to a federal registration.
Starting on the Fourth of July, Flav will be offering BOGO deals on their entire inventory of edibles, flower, and vapes, just in time for 710!
The post Summers are better with Flav appeared first on Leafly.
Three years after Thailand became the first Asian nation to decriminalize cannabis, its groundbreaking policy may collapse under political turmoil. The recent exit of the pro-cannabis Bhumjaithai Party from the ruling coalition, has left prohibitionists in control.
Thailand’s Parliament faces potential dissolution amid calls for Prime Minister Paetongtarn’s removal following a leaked phone call in which she called former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen “Uncle” and promised to “take care” of his concerns, even referring to a prominent Thai army commander as being part of “the opposite side.” In a country with 12 successful coups and 31 prime ministers since 1932, political upheaval isn’t speculation—it’s pattern. Whether through parliamentary maneuvering or military intervention, the disruption will derail cannabis reform along with everything else.
After the 2023 election, the anti-cannabis Move Forward Party won the most votes but couldn’t form a government. The second-place Pheu Thai Party (also anti-cannabis reform) then made a fateful choice: instead of aligning with ideologically similar Move Forward, it formed a coalition with conservative parties—including Bhumjaithai, the architects of decriminalization.
This marriage of convenience was doomed from the start. Pheu Thai promised to restrict cannabis to medical use only, while Bhumjaithai and its leader Anutin Charnvirakul refused to abandon his signature achievement. By mid-2024, the coalition gave up trying to reverse course, but the cannabis divide added to the political fault line that was breaking the government apart.
With Bhumjaithai now out of government, the pro-regulation movement has lost its strongest voice in government. This clears the path for Pheu Thai (who’s coalition now has only a razor thin margin) to realign with Move Forward (now the opposition People’s Party)—a party similarly hostile to cannabis liberalization. What began as an innovative public health and agricultural policy now faces potential reversal rather than regulation. In fact, just days after Bhumjaithai exited the coalition, the Health Ministry began moving forward with recriminalizing cannabis. The Health Ministry issued notices that medical prescriptions will soon be required to access cannabis while the government works on a more comprehensive recriminalization policy. Additionally, last week the Office of the Narcotics Control Board “deployed over 100 officers in a coordinated sweep of 20 cannabis shops across Bangkok.” Even though the minister of health stressed that the sweep had no connection to the Bhumjaithai Party exiting the ruling coalition, such a move cannot be overlooked as a sign of things to come.
Cannabis currently exists in a regulatory vacuum that serves no one well (prohibitionists and proponents alike). While no longer a scheduled narcotic, there’s no national framework governing cultivation, distribution, or sales or cannabis in Thailand. Unregulated and untested products are the standard, not the exception. Thousands of dispensaries operate without clear legal guidelines, creating compliance nightmares for investors and confusion for consumers.
The longer this “wild west” continues, the more ammunition it provides to prohibition advocates. Every incident involving unsafe products, youth access, or public disorder becomes evidence that decriminalization was a mistake. Cannabis reform proponents are losing the narrative battle by default—the absence of regulation creates the very problems that opponents will use to justify re-criminalization. Without quality controls, age restrictions, and proper oversight, Thai society bears the costs while prohibition forces collect the political benefits.
Unfortunately, without Bhumjaithai’s voice in government, any legal certainly will lean towards prohibition rather than regulation.
Thailand could dominate global medical cannabis markets given its agricultural advantages and growing expertise. But international buyers demand legal consistency, standardized quality, and trade compliance—none of which exist under the current system. Without formal national regulation, Thai producers remain largely locked out of lucrative export opportunities. With Pheu Thai focusing on medical cannabis, clarity here could be a bright spot in a future prohibitive regulatory framework.
Thai political instability makes positive cannabis reform unlikely in the near term. If new laws do emerge quickly, it appears that they’ll restrict rather than regulate. We are already seeing policy announcements from the Ministry of Health verifying this move towards restriction.
A dissolved Parliament would restart the entire political process—new elections, new coalitions, new priorities. Further electoral gains from Pheu Thai or Move Forward/People’s Party could be even more disastrous for cannabis.
Thailand’s cannabis experiment is collapsing under political chaos. In the Bhumjaithai Party’s absence, the prohibitionist leadership is already moving to scale back access in favor of a restrictive medical-only program. Unless the political winds shift and Bhumjaithai regains influence within the government, Thailand’s wild-west experiment appears headed for extinction.
Hopefully, this cautionary tale teaches the global cannabis community a critical lesson: decriminalization without regulation may earn applause in the short term, but it can create chaos that prohibition advocates exploit to justify reversal. We warned of this in 2022, when we explained what the Thai reforms actually meant, and wrote, “it seems like the government may end up playing a game of catch up as the market’s growth outpaces regulation.”
When policy creates a regulatory vacuum instead of a structured framework, opponents don’t need to manufacture problems—they simply point to the inevitable disorder and declare the experiment a failure. Thailand’s unraveling reform efforts are a stark reminder that sustainable cannabis reform requires deliberate regulation, not just the absence of criminalization.
Get ready for Pride weekend with us as we pair some of our favorite queer icons with the strains we think they’d smoke.
The post What strains would these queer icons smoke? appeared first on Leafly.
In the never-ending loop of federal marijuana reform debates, one crucial fact keeps getting overlooked: the Attorney General (AG) has the power to reschedule marijuana. Right now. No act of Congress. No HHS review. No rulemaking marathon. Just a signature.
Under 21 U.S.C. § 811(d)(1), the AG can unilaterally reschedule marijuana to better align U.S. drug policy with its international treaty obligations—specifically, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Single Convention). This isn’t legal speculation; it’s written into the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) itself. And unlike the current and traditional scheduling process under § 811(a)-(c), this route bypasses HHS and the need for any medical or scientific review.
There’s no need for complex rulemaking or an evidentiary record. All the AG has to do is believe that rescheduling marijuana to Schedule II, III, IV, or V better serves U.S. treaty obligations. Yes, the DEA would need to do some light follow-up rulemaking—but that’s been done before, and the Office of Legal Counsel has already signed off on it.
In other words: AG Bondi could reschedule marijuana tomorrow. All it would take is a press release and a pen.
The Single Convention (which refers to “cannabis,” not “marijuana”) requires that cannabis be “controlled” by member states to only medical, scientific, and industrial purposes. Such purposes must, however, ensure the availability of cannabis (not referenced specifically, but included in the definition of “drugs”) to patients for relief from pain and suffering. The Single Convention doesn’t mandate prohibition—it mandates regulation.
In 2020, the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs voted to remove cannabis from Schedule IV—the most restrictive category—leaving it only in Schedule I. That vote acknowledged the therapeutic potential of cannabis (Scheduling under the CSA and scheduling under the Single Convention do not correlate with each other). And yet, marijuana remains in Schedule I of the CSA—a category reserved for substances with no accepted medical use.
That contradiction puts the U.S. out of step with its obligations under the Single Convention. Schedules II through V under the CSA each acknowledge medical efficacy. So, if the goal of § 811(d)(1) is treaty compliance, rescheduling isn’t just permissible—it’s arguably required. Importantly, § 811(d)(1) makes clear that only the AG’s judgment matters when making that call. No scientific support, Congressional approval, or public comment is required.
Yes, any such action would invite lawsuits. Some would challenge the AG’s authority. Others would argue that § 811(d)(1) unconstitutionally delegates domestic policymaking to international organizations. (Note: the arguments here would have less applicability, because criminal penalties would slightly reduce under rescheduling.)
But while litigation played out, rescheduling would still take effect—and IRC § 280E would no longer apply. That’s an immediate tax win for state-legal businesses. Because the statutory authority is so clearly laid out, it’s unlikely even the most skeptical judge would stay (pause) rescheduling through litigation.
But let’s not forget that future AGs could reverse course just as easily. That’s the real weakness of this shortcut—it lacks permanence. In fact, even if marijuana gets rescheduled via the full DEA/HHS process and lands in Schedule III, a future AG could use § 811(d)(1) to shove it right back into Schedule I. That’s why long-term reform can’t rely solely on executive action.
Congressional action remains essential. It’s the only way to prevent policy from swinging with each administration. Congress can revise treaty obligations, override them, or exit them altogether. And unlike the executive branch, Congress can create a durable legal framework for marijuana that protects the industry from regulatory whiplash.
The States Reform Act 2.0 is currently the most viable legalization proposal in Congress. But it, too, has a gap: it doesn’t eliminate the AG’s authority under § 811(d)(1). A simple amendment could fix this by stating that § 811(d)(1) no longer applies to marijuana. Otherwise, even after Congressional action, a future AG could potentially reassert unilateral control (while such congressional action would likely prevail here, over the AG’s action, it would create confusion and uncertainty while litigation played out).
Theoretically, we could even see a similar situation with hemp play out. Because the 2018 Farm Bill removed hemp from the definition of marijuana—but didn’t reference § 811(d)(1)— the AG could, today, place hemp back into Schedule I.
If the marijuana industry wants true stability, with taxation and regulatory certainty, Congress must act—and act with specificity.
The marijuana industry has spent millions on traditional lobbying in the past six years. What do we have to show for it? Fragmented state markets, continued IRC § 280E applicability and enforcement, marijuana still in Schedule I, and a counterproductive research bill (the Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research Expansion Act) that ultimately will makes things worse for researching marijuana.
It’s time to admit: the current approach to lobbying has failed.
The industry needs a new strategy—one grounded in political reality. That includes reassessing who gets paid, and for what. It’s uncomfortable, but worth saying: under the current administration, success might depend less on policy arguments and more on simply writing a check. Success means navigating the political system we have, while continuing to build back the one we want.
It sounds cynical. It is cynical. But it may also be true.
The power to reschedule marijuana already exists, but the industry’s path forward depends on more than legal authority. It requires political will. AG action could trigger immediate benefits, but only Congress can provide lasting certainty. Traditional lobbying has failed to move the needle, and it’s time for the industry to engage more strategically. If marijuana stakeholders want real reform, they must act decisively. Maybe it’s time for the industry to play the political game as it is, not as we wish it were.
Read Leafly's queer staff recommendations for the strains and brands we can't get enough of this Pride Month and beyond.
The post What is Leafly’s queer staff smoking this Pride? appeared first on Leafly.
You may have seen this article or some other article yesterday or today, covering the Ontario Supreme Court’s recent certification of a national class action lawsuit against Aurora Cannabis. The defendant entities are all part of the same conglomerate, with Aurora Cannabis Inc. being the parent. You can view their vast array of cannabis products here.
Aside from securities litigation, class action lawsuits seldom drop in the cannabis space. So this one got me thinking. Below are some thoughts in Q&A format.
Here is the Statement of Claim. In short, the complaint is that the defendants negligently failed to warn consumers, patients and their treating professionals of the risk of developing cannabis hyperemesis syndrome (CHS). This risk was allegedly posed by the plaintiffs’ ordinary use of the defendants’ cannabis products.
In addition to alleging negligence, the plaintiffs allege breach of consumer protection statutes and, somewhat awkwardly, unjust enrichment. According a claim summary, the defendants’ failure “is alleged to be particularly egregious given that cannabis products are often recommended by healthcare professionals to treat nausea, which paradoxically is a common symptom of CHS.”
Qualified sources define CHS as: 1) a “syndrome of cyclic vomiting associated with cannabis use”; and as 2) “characterized by cyclical episodes of nausea and vomiting, accompanied by abdominal pain following prolonged, high-dose cannabis use, which is alleviated by hot baths and showers.” Interestingly, the latter source observes that “little is known about the cause of this syndrome.”
Here, too, is a 2025 National Library of Medicine journal abstract on the topic, with a similar definitional and etiological take, and adding this noteworthy fact: “Although considered rare, there has been a steady increase in CHS diagnoses. . . ..” Whether that means CHS is actually occurring more frequently is another question.
Hard to say. The lawsuit alleges that “[t]he Defendants knew or ought to have known of all the serious harmful effects arising from the consumption of their Cannabis Products.” If that’s right, a cynical answer is that warnings weren’t given because sales would have suffered.
It’s also likely, though, that warnings weren’t given because they are not required by Health Canada regulations or the Cannabis Act. Here, it’s worth noting that cannabis packaging rules in Canada are quite strict and comprehensive, and they do require other “health warning messages.” These include warnings about overconsumption leading to “cannabis poisoning” and “severe anxiety and panic attacks.” But warnings related to CHS are not required.
Probably not. Getting damages from a government is generally harder—much harder— than getting damages from a private party. Governments and public officials have so much immunity.
The fact that Canadian laws do not require CHS-related disclosures is important, though. You can expect the defendants to argue that they strictly complied with all packaging and labeling requirements with respect to the allegedly hazardous, heavily regulated products—including giving all requisite health warnings. If you buttress that argument with the “unclear etiology” piece, and the fact that CHS diagnoses are still rare, and the fact that some of these plaintiffs appeared to have professional medical advisers, it starts to look pretty good.
Possibly. Like the U.S., Canada utilizes the DSM-5, which lists cannabis use disorder (“CUD”) among its diagnosable mental health conditions. The DSM-5 defines CUD as “the presence of clinically significant impairment or distress in 12 months, manifested by at least two of a series of symptoms or behaviors.” You can see the definition and full list of symptoms/behaviors here.
The fact that the defendants are being sued for knowingly causing CHS makes it seem just as likely they could be sued for knowingly causing CUD— another adverse, cannabis-related health outcome that is seemingly better understood and established than CHS. The defendants don’t appear to be warning about either affliction. I wonder if anyone is.
The U.S. is much different than Canada in that cannabis is federally prohibited. All U.S. regulations around cannabis provision and sale—including those around packaging, labeling and warnings—are left to the states. If U.S. “copycat” lawsuits ensue, they would be on a state-by-state basis, implicating state law claims.
As with Health Canada, though, U.S. states that permit cannabis sales have strict (and onerous) packaging and labeling requirements. If a company wanted to be very careful, it could start including warnings about CHS and CUD on its labels, but only if a) it could afford to go through the label re-creation and re-approval process, and b) there were any space!
Daniel Smith at Strategies 64 had a nice piece this week called “the Future of Cannabis Labeling is Digital”, where he summarizes all of the challenges and confusion around cannabis labeling requirements among the many states, and offers that:
“the most practical way to modernize and improve cannabis labeling is to leverage QR codes or similar technology, which allow consumers to access websites or other online resources by scanning a code on the product.”
With unlimited space, it would be much easier for cannabis companies to issue prophylactic statements on CHS or CUD, or whatever—even if the regulations don’t require it. One interesting argument in the CHS lawsuit, after all, is:
“while the defendants maintain websites that provide information about the Cannabis Products to consumers and prescribing physicians, these websites do not warn of or even mention the risk of CHS. The Defendants do not publish product monographs for the Cannabis Products . . . . communicating the risk of CHS.”
This seems like one of those cases where a bit of fine print would have gone a long way.
We may see some cautious operators north and south of the border start to place CHS, CUD and/or additional health-related disclaimers on their websites or labels, with the typically required driving- and pregnancy-oriented statements.
As far as this particular lawsuit, I don’t know Canadian law and I’m not a litigator—much less a class action pro. The plaintiffs are currently seeking to build out their potentially large class after clearing the sizable certification hurdle. So whatever ends up happening will probably take a while.
In the meantime, mass tort exposure is just one more hazard for cannabis operators to consider—especially the larger outfits. Watch this space.
Find the best dab rigs of 2025. Leafly reviewed popular dab rigs & chose what we think are the top picks for different needs and budgets.
The post Leafly’s top 10 dab rigs of 2025 appeared first on Leafly.
Shop LGBTQIA+ brands and dispensaries this Pride and beyond with Leafly's curated list of queer brands & retailers.
The post Shop LGBTQIA+ brands and dispensaries this Pride Month and beyond appeared first on Leafly.
Running a cannabis business is difficult and many people fail. These ventures bottom out for myriad reasons, although owners tend to blame federal law issues first of all. It’s true that federal law creates a tough environment for cannabis businesses (tax issues, market saturation, geographic constraints, etc.), but federal prohibition also has kept big money sidelined, giving small business a real head start.
My view, after seeing many spectacular failures and slow motion crashes over the past several years, is that most bad outcomes are a combination of the following: 1) a challenging legal and regulatory environment, 2) saturated markets, and 3) operator error.
A start-up cannabis business cannot control the first two items listed above, but should be able to navigate them. The third item is a different animal. Margins of error tend to be slim for most cannabis ventures, and self-inflicted wounds are difficult to overcome. This blog post covers the five biggest mistakes we continue to see in early-stage cannabis businesses—specifically in Oregon—and gives suggestions to avoid them.
The Oregon legislature passed a moratorium on new marijuana license applications last year. This means that market entrants must buy their way in through asset or stock sales from existing licensees. The OLCC has a small team of change-in-ownership investigators who work with both buyers and sellers on these transactions. Based on current, published timelines, applications submitted the first week in April are currently being assigned and reviewed. So, we’re a little over two months out.
Does this mean a new market entrant can expect to be licensed two or three months after inking a deal? No, it doesn’t. Five or so months is a more common timeframe. Here is how the process works:
As a general rule of thumb, change-in-location applications tend to take longer than purchases of licenses “in place.” But many of these processes take five to seven months regardless. The trick for buyers is to deploy as little capital as possible during the dead zone.
It’s worth noting that cannabis business sales aren’t unique in taking some time. I’ve seen many non-cannabis business sales delayed by diligence issues, lease negotiations, ironing out terms in final agreements, etc. In the Oregon cannabis industry, administrative vetting and disclosure requirements must be added to that list.
Finally, I’ll add that delays are usually (but not always) on the buyer side, stemming from initial business structuring, filling out OLCC forms, submitting fingerprints, etc. Again, buyers should create realistic timelines to avoid hemorrhaging cash during this phase, and should strongly consider working with someone who has navigated the change-in-ownership process before. It’s a singular process and there is some art to it.
A couple of months ago, I wrote a post called “Please Do Not Use Agreements from Brokers.” I wrote this after dealing with three or four messed up transactions in a compressed period, all stemming from brokers providing recycled forms for OLCC transactions. In fairness, the problematic deals are not always broker-related. Many purchasers and sellers wing these deals in one way or another. I recommend hiring qualified counsel to assist with these.
The place to save a few bucks in license acquisition is the OLCC application process. Our Portland office philosophy has always been not to blow through client retainers on lawyers doing ministerial work: We want people to succeed so we can work with them for years. For that reason, we have licensing paralegals who help push these applications through efficiently and expertly. Attorneys only come in for unusual situations. The bottom line here is that new businesses should save their legal budgets for work that cannot be done by non-lawyers.
In 2025, the word is out that you are not going to sell your marijuana for $2,000 a pound in Oregon. But we still see unrealistic projections up and down the supply chain.
You should not budget a six-figure salary for yourself. You should avoid oppressive lease and financing terms—and debt at all costs, if you can. You should realize that marijuana is likely not going to Schedule III this year, and that IRC 280E will continue to kneecap margins. You should understand that industry standards can be low, and that vendors and other parties will sometimes let you down.
In short, it is crucial to dial in your research and expectations before starting out – especially if you are taking on investment and the legal risk attached to that. An Oregon cannabis license is not a certificate to print money, especially in 2025.
For whatever reason, employment practices are often subpar with cannabis businesses. There are a couple of important things to note here.
The first is that employee actions, even if unauthorized, can lead to license revocation in Oregon. This means you must ensure your employees are well versed in compliance, and you have to watch them.
The second thing to note is employment law is complex and seems to change as often as cannabis licensing rules. Whenever there is a dispute, courts and administrative bodies tend to favor employees, so it’s important to keep your team in order.
You do not need a tall stack of complex documents to start a cannabis business. You do need the basics, though, and those agreements should be thought out and solid.
If you are renting property, get a tailored industry lease. If you are organizing an LLC, get an operating agreement that covers matters important to your business— including management, distributions, protocol for when someone jeopardizes the OLCC license, etc. Or, if you have a white label agreement, ensure that all processes and intellectual property ownership are delineated. The list goes on.
Starting a business can be expensive, and people tend to skim on legal. But nearly all of the cannabis litigation matters my firm is currently handling (and there are so many right now) stem from defective contracts, and from people operating informally in that sense. Reasonably tailored contracts should be a part of any new business plan, and they should not break the bank. These contracts will set both guidelines and expectations for the business, and they operate like insurance when things go wrong.
Find the best CBD for dogs of 2025. Leafly reviewed popular CBD pet products & chose the top picks for different needs and budgets.
The post Leafly’s top 11 CBD products for dogs of 2025 appeared first on Leafly.
We’re proud to share that attorney Jason Adelstone will be a featured panelist at this year’s Cannabis Law Institute (CLI 2025), hosted by the International Cannabis Bar Association (INCBA). Taking place June 12–13, 2025 at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, CLI 2025 is widely recognized as the leading annual conference for cannabis law professionals.
Jason will join the panel “The Next Decade of Cannabis: Springboarding Forward from Initial State Regulatory Systems,” where he and fellow experts will examine the future of cannabis policy and reform. Topics will include international regulatory developments, U.S. federal reform efforts, the standardization of state programs, and emerging intersections with industries like hospitality and gaming.
As the cannabis industry enters a critical next phase, Jason’s deep experience in regulatory compliance and international drug policy will bring valuable perspective to this forward-looking conversation.
For more information or to register, visit www.incba.org.
Time for another Oregon cannabis roundup. Time to cover some important legislative and OLCC updates, specifically.
Governor Tina Kotek signed this bill into law last week, on May 28th. There are some key differences to the law signed by Kotek and the version of SB 558 that I previewed in January, at the start of the legislative session.
CIAO, the local cannabis trade group, was a big supporter of SB 558, particularly the provisions around new trade sample limits and producer-to-producer flower transfers.
Here’s what the new law does, with a few comments from me:
Unlike a lot of cannabis laws passed in Oregon over the years, this one did not go through on an “emergency” basis, and it does not take immediate effect. Instead, SB 558 takes effect 91 days after June 29th (legislative sin die). By my calculation, that is September 28, 2025. The trade samples provisions don’t go live until January 1, 2026.
This one is very close— to use a fancy foreign phrase, its passage is a fait accompli. The Senate President signed SB 162 last week and the House Speaker signed on Tuesday. I have no reason to believe Governor Kotek won’t sign, or that she will veto the bill. Note that even if Kotek doesn’t sign, SB 162 would be enshrined next week automatically.
SB 162 is an omnibus bill, which I also previewed back in January. Like SB 558, it underwent some changes over the course of the session, but still includes certain law enforcement priorities in keeping with the original thrust of the bill. Here is what it does:
I wrote a “breaking news” post on May 20th, the day the Oregon District Court ruled in favor of a couple of Oregon cannabis plaintiffs. I explained that:
Although the ruling is tailored toward these two plaintiffs, the Court functionally enjoins OLCC and others from enforcing BM 119 across the board. The Court found that BM 119 failed under both the National Labor Relations Act and the First Amendment to the Constitution. We’ve long anticipated this ruling here on the blog, because it wasn’t a particularly close call.
I also wrote:
Please also stay tuned for updates from OLCC, which should explain that the LPA requirement is a goner, with license renewals and change in ownership applications proceeding as they did before this regrettable exercise.
Well, that happened. On May 29th, OLCC issued this welcome bulletin, which pronounced as follows:
[E]ffective immediately the Commission will no longer require as part of a new or renewal application for the license types that were subject to Measure 119, a signed labor peace agreement (LPA) between an applicant and a bona fide labor organization, or an attestation signed by the applicant and bona fide labor organization. . . .
OLCC will be processing pending renewals if the only missing information was a LPA or a LPA related attestation.
(Emphasis in original.) You love to see it. UFCW Local 555 is on record grumbling that the judge got it wrong and the state could win on appeal. I’d be surprised to see the state take it up.
The Commission actually wrote me last week, and asked to provide blog content advertising the coming prohibition on most CBN sales. This rule has actually been a long time coming, with its genesis in I said I’d write about it, so here it is:
Beginning July 1, 2025, products containing artificially derived CBN can no longer be sold in Oregon, either in the OLCC system or in the general (hemp-derived) market, unless the manufacturer has made a “Generally Recognized as Safe” (GRAS) determination, or submitted a New Dietary Ingredient Notification to the FDA and received a “no objections” response.
OLCC reports that they are unaware of any manufacturers who can currently meet these standards. I’m not either. You can read the OLCC’s full compliance bulletin here, where they trace the rulemaking history back to House Bill 3000 in 2021. I gave my take back then, here.
Finally, OLCC Executive Director Craig Prins announced that he is retiring last month. Happy trails!
Prins had a mostly uneventful tenure, at least compared to all that came before. Prins clocks out forever on July 1st, at which point someone named Tara Wasiak takes over. I don’t know anything about Wasiak, other than she works at the Portland Bureau of Transportation. Hopefully that translates, somehow.
Read our Father's Day weed gift guide for curated picks for the cannabis-loving father figure in your life.
The post Father’s Day weed gift guide appeared first on Leafly.
In yet another setback for hemp and marijuana-adjacent businesses, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) has quietly reintroduced a policy that effectively disqualifies most of them from critical federal loan programs. The updated policy, effective June 1, has far-reaching consequences for small businesses operating in compliance with state law (and for some, in compliance with federal law) – especially those selling hemp-derived foods, supplements, and cosmetics (collectively, “Consumable Hemp Products”).
In a previous post, America’s Missed Opportunity in the Global Marijuana Market, I outlined the broader systemic issues facing the marijuana industry. This latest shift by the SBA, however, zeroes in on hemp operators, especially those producing or selling Consumable Hemp Products.
(A note on terminology before I get started: Given how U.S. law separates marijuana and hemp, it’s time for both the industry and regulators to stop using ‘cannabis’ as a stand-in for marijuana. Cannabis is the plant species that includes both marijuana and hemp. Using ‘cannabis’ to mean only marijuana creates unnecessary confusion – especially since ‘cannabis’ could just as easily refer to hemp. If you’re referring to both, then ‘cannabis’ is appropriate. Otherwise, be specific.)
The SBA’s latest update to its 7(a) and 504 loan programs represents a return to the more restrictive, 2020 policy. This shift may not only severely limit access to these critical funding programs for operators involved with Consumable Hemp Products but also impact ancillary businesses serving both cannabis industries
The SBA’s 7(a) and 504 loan programs have supported small business growth for almost two decades. The 7(a) loan is the SBA’s flagship program for general business financing, while the 504 program offers long-term, fixed-rate funding for major capital investments like real estate and equipment – essential tools for expansion and job creation.
Since the passage of the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (commonly known as the 2018 Farm Bill), which federally legalized hemp, the SBA has updated its policies several times, including how it addresses hemp-derived businesses. These policy changes reflect not only the tension between federal and state law but also shifting political winds and agency interpretation.
The SBA’s first policy following the 2018 Farm Bill briefly acknowledged that hemp businesses complying with federal law were eligible for SBA loans
This marked a more comprehensive approach. Lenders were tasked with verifying compliance with all applicable laws, and the SBA offered detailed guidance on evaluating CBD-related businesses. These rules form the backbone of the current policy.
In a surprising shift, this policy removed all references to hemp. Instead, it simply stated that SBA loans were unavailable to businesses engaged in activities illegal under federal, state, or local law – explicitly using marijuana as an example.
Further removed the marijuana example from the August 2023 policy.
This update reintroduces and expands on the 2020 restrictions, explicitly targeting Consumable Hemp Products. Specifically, it emphasizes that the addition of CBD to any human or animal food, dietary supplement, or certain cosmetics is prohibited under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), and links to FDA guidance that includes products with THC in this prohibition as well.
The new policy requires hemp businesses to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, but given the FD&C Act’s prohibitions, most are now categorically ineligible.
(Another quick sidebar: The Consumable Hemp Product sector has grown rapidly, and not always responsibly. Many bad actors have pushed products with little regard for compliance or consumer health & safety. These operators should not receive federal support. But compliant, responsible, and well-intentioned businesses are being swept up in the fallout. The SBA’s new policy risks punishing good actors because of bad ones.)
This new SBA policy disproportionately harms the businesses the SBA is designed to support. Large, well-capitalized companies, backed by millionaire or billionaire investors, can often secure private funding. But for small, independently owned businesses, many of which are still struggling to scale in a competitive market, these loan programs represent a critical source of support.
Similar to what I discussed in Is There a Method to the Mayhem? The Stock Market and a Potential Cannabis Collapse, the hemp market already shows signs of volatility. Denying small, compliant hemp businesses access to SBA capital will only accelerate that trend, pushing out mom-and-pop operators and concentrating industry control in the hands of a few.
Let’s be clear: the FDA has not meaningfully enforced the FD&C Act when it comes to Consumable Hemp Products. Instead, it has focused on operators making unsubstantiated medical claims. This non-enforcement created an “illusion of legality” and allowed the market to flourish – despite underlying noncompliance.
But now, the SBA is stepping in where the FDA hasn’t. By shifting the hemp compliance burden to lenders, the SBA has created a new chokepoint. Effectively enforcing federal restrictions without actual enforcement.
Since 2018, most hemp operators have focused almost exclusively on the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). They assume that since “hemp” was removed from the definition of “marihuana,” their products were legal. But that’s a dangerously narrow reading. They completely ignore the FD&C Act and state hemp laws (remember, you must comply with laws in both the originating state and destination state).
Section 301(II) of the FD&C Act, and related policies, expressly prohibit introducing or delivering for introduction into interstate commerce any food (including animal food or feed) to which THC or CBD has been added. This isn’t new. It has been around for a while. So yes, the THC/CBD hemp seltzers at Total Wine and gummies at your local convenience store are illegal under federal law.
Let me be absolutely clear: Consumable Hemp Products sold across state lines are illegal under federal law. Full stop.
Lenders must assess a hemp business’s eligibility based on several factors that “include, but are not limited to, the following:” (emphasis added)
The SBA’s policy includes language that expressly prohibits some fully legal and compliant businesses from receiving loans. It also prohibits “businesses that derive revenue from marijuana-related activities” from eligibility – a phrase vague enough to allow for near-unlimited discretion by lenders. Many of which will understandably adopt an overly cautious interpretation, resulting in de facto disqualification even where the law doesn’t expressly prohibit funding.
The FD&C Act primarily governs interstate commerce. So, hemp businesses operating entirely within a single state – and compliant with that state’s laws – may still qualify for SBA loans. But this is a narrow window, and even these businesses should expect intense lender scrutiny.
The SBA policy also disqualifies businesses selling items “primarily intended or designed for marijuana use,” like bongs, pipes, and vaporizers. But under 21 U.S.C. § 863(f)(1), these items are not illegal federally if authorized by state or local law.
In around 15 states, marijuana-related paraphernalia is explicitly legal. Yet the SBA’s blanket prohibition ignores that reality – inviting a legal challenge. For example, a head shop in Washington State selling glass marijuana pipes and vaporizers operates completely legally under state law (and thus, federal law), would be categorically denied SBA funding under this policy.
If any such paraphernalia business is interested in challenging this policy, I would encourage them to do so – particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which curtailed agency deference and emphasized the judiciary’s role in reviewing whether agencies have overstepped their statutory authority. This may be an ideal test case since the agency policy directly contradicts a explicit federal statute.
Perhaps most troubling is the SBA’s vague application of the term “derive revenue from marijuana-related activities.” This could encompass a wide range of ancillary businesses that do not handle the plant, do not sell to consumers, and do not engage in any activity illegal under state or federal law (yes, arguments can be made for aiding and abetting and conspiracy, but that discussion is for another day). It will all depend entirely on how conservatively a lender interprets “revenue derived from marijuana-related activities.”
This could lead to an odd situation where small business competitors of some NASDAQ listed companies might not qualify for these SBA loans, despite their larger contemporaries being listed on a public exchange (subject to what I discuss below about potential delisting).
For example, some businesses that could now be denied by SBA lenders are:
While the above businesses/industries, are not expressly disqualified by the plain text of the SBA policy, the broadness of the language could lead to such an outcome. Because the burden of compliance and risk lies with lenders, many lenders will likely take an overly cautious approach and deny applications – creating de facto ineligibility for businesses that should otherwise qualify.
The SBA’s revised policy marks yet another instance where cannabis-related businesses, even those operating entirely within the bounds of state and sometimes federal law, are punished not for illegality, but for proximity and uncertainty.
What makes this policy shift so dangerous is not just what it says, but what it signals. As stated above, what makes the SBA’s current policy especially significant is that 7(a) and 504 loans place the burden of legal compliance for issuing these loans on SBA lenders, not the SBA itself. When lenders are tasked with interpreting vague legality standards, they’ll usually err on the side of risk aversion. We’ve seen this movie before in cannabis banking.
Could we see other agencies implement similar language into their regulations and policies? It wouldn’t be surprising given some of the “Refer Madness” proponents being placed in agencies throughout our federal government. Below are just a few example of what we could see, applying the same or similar language to the current SBA policy:
For years, hemp businesses relied on a combination of loopholes, non-enforcement, and regulatory ambiguity to build billion-dollar markets. But the SBA’s June 1 policy shows how fragile that foundation was. Even without an active enforcement regime, federal agencies can still erect walls by forcing third parties – like lenders – to interpret the law.
For small businesses, this is especially dangerous. Unlike well-funded operators with access to private capital, they depend on SBA programs to survive and grow. With this new policy, compliance confusion becomes a death sentence.
Further, other federal agencies may see that neither DEA nor FDA need to enforce federal law to shut down the Consumable Hemp Product industry. All that may be required is well placed federal policies that demand compliance with the FD&C Act.
If you’re a hemp operator or ancillary marijuana business affected by this policy:
This is a pivotal moment. The SBA policy could either be a temporary roadblock or the beginning of a coordinated regulatory crackdown on Consumable Hemp Products. What happens next depends on how the industry responds.
The hemp industry has come a long way since the 2018 Farm Bill, but its legal landscape remains anything but straightforward. At Harris Sliwoski, we’ve taken a steady, realistic approach to the risks and opportunities in this sector, because when the law is unsettled, good advice matters more than ever.
Yes, hemp with less than 0.3% THC is federally legal. But that doesn’t mean every hemp product is legal, or that every agency, state, or local authority agrees on what “legal” even means. Between shifting FDA guidance, banking headaches, inconsistent state rules, and sudden enforcement swings, hemp businesses operate in a thicket of legal uncertainty.
We’ve seen too many businesses get burned by legal advice that was overly confident or willfully blind to regulatory gray areas. That’s not how we work. Our focus is on helping clients move forward without getting blindsided. We do this by staying current, digging deep, and telling our clients the truth about the risks they face – even when it’s not what they want to hear.
Our clients include farmers, processors, retailers, and investors who want to build sustainable hemp businesses that can stand up to scrutiny. We help them do that with strategies grounded in law, not wishful thinking.
For hemp businesses, staying ahead means recognizing that today’s legal gray area could be tomorrow’s red line.
